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Abstract
To further dialogue between theory and research on deliberative
democracy, I advocate abandoning tests of deliberative theory per
se and instead developing “middle-range” theories that are each im-
portant, speciﬁable, and falsiﬁable parts of deliberative democratic
theory. By replacing vaguely deﬁned entities with more concrete, cir-
cumscribed concepts, and by requiring empirically and theoretically
grounded hypotheses about speciﬁc relationships between those
concepts, researchers may come to understand which elements of
the deliberative experience are crucial to particular valued outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The dialogue between political theorists in-
terested in deliberative democracy and those
who study deliberative democracy empirically
has been strained at best. As Thompson (2008)
describes in this volume, both groups seem to
realize that they have much to gain from one
another, yet frustration remains on both sides
due to our inability to accept one another’s
assumptions and even to understand one an-
other’s terms. Indeed, for many political sci-
entists, reading theorists’ accounts of deliber-
ative democracy can be aggravating. On the
one hand, many of the assertions seem to cry
out for empirical veriﬁcation. On the other
hand, much of the empirical work in this vein
has been deemed irrelevant to the theory of
deliberative democracy by political theorists.
Excellent reviews of this literature have
been provided elsewhere (in addition to
Thompson’s article, see also Ryfe 2005, Delli
Carpini et al. 2004, Mendelberg 2002). My
purpose here is to delve deeper into the
conversation—or lack thereof—between the-
ory and empirical research in this important
area to see what progress might be made.
In contrast to Thompson, I approach this
dilemma from the perspective of empirical so-
cial scientists who want to test the posited
beneﬁcial consequences of deliberative the-
ory. The general question before us as empir-
ical researchers is: How can we take what has
been, by its origins, a normative theory and
turn it into an empirically testable theory?
I begin with an overview of the problems
involved in constructing deliberative demo-
cratic theory in terms that satisfy the re-
quirements for a productive and testable so-
cial theory. A great deal of the difﬁculty in
this conversation results from deﬁnitions of
deliberative democracy that are too broad
and that effectively insulate the theory from
falsiﬁcation. Falsiﬁability—the possibility of
refutation—is held to be essential to the sci-
entiﬁc method because it offers the possibil-
ity of scientiﬁc progress: Faulty theories will
encounter refuting evidence and will be dis-
carded in favor of other theories. Philosophers
of science consider falsiﬁability an essential
requirement for a theory to be deemed scien-
tiﬁc (see Popper 1963); some go so far as to
say that unfalsiﬁable hypotheses are meaning-
less. As I describe below, unfalsiﬁable aspects
of deliberative theory translate into concrete
obstacles that prevent testing and improving
the theory.
To further dialogue between theory and re-
search on deliberative democracy, I advocate
abandoning tests of deliberative theory per
se, advocating instead developing “middle-
range” theories that are each important, speci-
ﬁable, and falsiﬁable parts of deliberative
democratic theory.1 Transforming delibera-
tive theory into middle-range theory means
replacing vaguely deﬁned entities with more
concrete, circumscribed concepts, and substi-
tuting hypotheses about speciﬁc relationships
between those concepts for grander theoreti-
cal frameworks. If, as Ryfe (2005, p. 64) sug-
gests, “The theory of deliberative democracy
needlessly remains removed from its prac-
tice,” then this is a necessary step toward rec-
tifying this problem.
This article explores the nature of the
problem facing empirical researchers and then
proposes how they might, nevertheless, move
forward. In addition to helping bridge the
normative-empirical divide in a way that
moves empirical research forward, my goal is
to illuminate for theorists the sources of dif-
ﬁculty facing empirical researchers who gen-
uinely want to add to this conversation. While
Thompson (2008) has done an excellent job il-
luminating the perspective of normative the-
orists, I seek to detail the predicament of the
social science researcher interested in delib-
erative theory. As a social scientist, my goal
is not to play armchair political theorist, but
1Merton (1957) advocated the “middle-range” approach as
a means of bridging the gap between theory and empirical
evidence and thus advancing social science. Middle-range
theory suggests that “it is hopeless and quixotic to try to
determine the overarching independent variable” as “grand
theory” often tries to do (Boudon 1991, p. 519), but it is
nonetheless important to take “theory” seriously, that is,
to formulate a consolidating idea about a set of hypotheses
that can be empirically tested.
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rather to translate the theory from one set of
terms and standards to another. If researchers
do not go about testing deliberative theory in
a way that speaks to political theory, then the
theory is unlikely to realize its potential theo-
retically or empirically, and political scientists
will have missed an important opportunity.
CAN EMPIRICAL THEORY
SPEAK TO NORMATIVE
THEORY?
Thompson (2008) characterizes empirical re-
search on deliberative democracy as follows:
“They extract from isolated passages in vari-
ous theoretical writings a simpliﬁed statement
about one or more beneﬁts of deliberative
democracy, compress it into a testable hypoth-
esis, ﬁnd or (more often) artiﬁcially create a
site in which people talk about politics, and
conclude that deliberation does not produce
the beneﬁts the theory promised and may even
be counterproductive.”
Theorists clearly ﬁnd empirical contribu-
tions to this conversation lacking; most of the
research is said to be “not fully engaged with
the normative theory” (Thompson 2008). But
it is not clear if the conclusions reached by
these studies are what is deemed objection-
able, or the way the studies are conducted or
evaluated. The latter is the more appropriate
concern for empirical researchers. For a the-
ory to be falsiﬁable, one should consider dis-
conﬁrmations as valid as conﬁrmations. Given
the well-documented bias in published stud-
ies toward signiﬁcant ﬁndings as opposed to
null hypotheses, it would be surprising in-
deed if the outcomes of published studies
were tilted in this direction (see Gerber &
Malhotra 2007, 2008). Thompson’s observa-
tion suggests that, in fact, disconﬁrming evi-
dence is more prevalent than conﬁrming ev-
idence. Other summaries have characterized
ﬁndings as mixed, which comes closer to my
own reading. From a normative point of view,
there may be legitimate complaints about the
nature of the research questions scholars ask,
but there is little basis for criticizing the con-
clusions these studies reach, assuming they are
done skillfully.
Normative theory requires ethical com-
mitments on the part of researchers; that is,
some kinds of attitudes and behaviors must
be valued above others. However, normative
theory in this case also promises empirically
observable beneﬁts. Whether at the individual
level (e.g., greater tolerance, depth of under-
standing) or the level of the collective (e.g., a
consensual decision, increased social capital),
deliberation promises observable beneﬁts.
The whole reason deliberative democracy is
normatively desirable is because it is thought
to produce tangible beneﬁts for democratic
citizens and societies.
Of course, anyone who has read empirical
research on deliberative theory will recognize
that it is also value-laden, in that such stud-
ies typically begin and end with an assertion
that some outcomes are more promising or
disappointing than others. Empirical research
ﬁndings are interesting and/or important pre-
cisely because they tell us something about
some consequence that is positively or nega-
tively valued.
Although normative theory is obviously
not testable in the usual sense, to the extent
that scholars agree on which criteria are ben-
eﬁcial for a democratic society, then we can,
within the boundaries of these speciﬁc crite-
ria, evaluate whether deliberation contributes
toward those ends. This is the shared ground
where normative theory and empirical social
science meet. Regardless of how one deﬁnes
or studies deliberation, certain kinds of out-
comes are consensually valued by theorists
and empiricists alike. These include, but are
not limited to, more public-spirited attitudes;
more informed citizens; greater understand-
ing of the sources of, or rationales behind,
public disagreements; a stronger sense of
political efﬁcacy; willingness to compromise;
greater interest in political participation;
and, for some theorists, a binding consensus
decision. The perceived legitimacy of the de-
cision outcome is also argued to be enhanced
through deliberation, although some theorists
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suggest that regardless of how it is perceived,
the process is inherently legitimizing. Still, it
is difﬁcult to conceive of inherent legitimacy
beneﬁting a democratic society without also
being perceived as such by its citizens. More-
over, inherent legitimacy is not observable;
empirical researchers must, of necessity, study
perceptions or some other manifestation of
legitimacy.
But all of this is not to say that the dis-
tinction between these two lines of research
is murky. The key difference is that, in nor-
mative political theory, the activity described
as deliberation is assumed to have certain ben-
eﬁcial outcomes, and in empirical research,
it is hypothesized to have those same desirable
outcomes. Hypotheses often turn out to be
wrong, but assumptions, by their very nature,
cannot be.
So although deliberative theorists may ar-
gue that they are not trying to make empirical
predictions so much as “clarifying a norma-
tive standard” (Neblo 2005, p. 172), delib-
erative theory does make implicit empirical
predictions, and empirical research does in-
corporate implicit normative commitments.
The challenge for advocates of deliberative
democracy is to persuade skeptics who want
evidence, rather than theoretical logic, that
people will, on average, be better citizens if
they take part in deliberation (see Przeworski
1998, p. 142).
This general challenge is one that requires
empirical research. Having established some
common ground that might form the ba-
sis for bridging theoretical and empirical ap-
proaches, I next examine how well delibera-
tive theory ﬁts the requirements of a useful
and productive theory for purposes of empir-
ical social science.
WHAT MAKES GOOD
EMPIRICAL THEORY?
The most general requirement for produc-
tive empirical theory is falsiﬁability, which is
deemed a minimal requirement for a produc-
tive social theory. In a nutshell, for a theory
to be falsiﬁable, it must be the case that if a
study were set up in a particular way, its results
could conceivably contradict the predictions
of the theory. Although no single empirical
test ever completely refutes or “disproves” a
theory, it must be possible that evidence could
counter the theory’s assumptions, and a steady
accumulation of such negative evidence would
build a convincing case against it.
Falsiﬁability is probably the single most in-
transigent issue in getting normative theory
and empirical research to speak to one another
in the realm of deliberative theory. Several
problems conspire to make deliberative the-
ory elusive in this respect. For some theorists,
deliberation is simply deﬁned as intrinsically
good. Obviously, such a claim renders empiri-
cal research irrelevant (see, e.g., Stokes 1998).
But even without the assumption of intrinsic
goodness, more complex problems hinder the
interaction between empirical studies and po-
litical theory.
It is difﬁcult to envision an empirical test
that might produce evidence construed by
theorists and empiricists alike as disconﬁrm-
ing the claims of deliberative theory. This is
because deliberation falls short on many of the
standards deemed essential to good social sci-
ence theory, at least as the theory is currently
construed. Beyond the general issue of falsiﬁ-
ability, deliberative theory falls short of meet-
ing three requirements for productive social
theory that are enumerated in virtually any
textbook:
1. clearly deﬁned concepts;
2. speciﬁcation of logical relationships
among concepts within the theory;
3. consistency between hypotheses and ev-
idence accumulated to date.
It is, of course, unfair to criticize a norma-
tive theory for lacking the characteristics re-
quired of productive social science theory. But
criticism is not my main purpose. Instead, I
want to take seriously the admonition that the
two subﬁelds should talk to one another. To
make a dialogue possible, this normative the-
ory must be translated into the terminology
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of empirical social science and must then be
subjected to the standards of theory testing
within the social science tradition. It is crucial
to address these three problems in order to
accumulate useful empirical evidence on the
potential of deliberative democracy.
Social scientists generally deﬁne “theory”
as a set of interrelated statements intended to
explain and/or make predictions about some
aspect of social life. Toward those ends, a
good theory is supposed to have well-deﬁned
constructs of general theoretical interest. It
is supposed to describe logical associations
among these constructs (which are most of-
ten causal associations), and it should allow
for connections between the theoretical con-
structs and observable entities. When theo-
ries cannot meet these three criteria, they are
generally unproductive in advancing our un-
derstanding of the phenomenon of interest.2
What happens when empirical researchers
attempt to translate deliberative theory into
these terms? First, as Thompson points out,
they discover a great deal of conceptual am-
biguity as to what should qualify as deliber-
ation. Moreover, the deﬁnitions offered by
theorists frequently conﬂate causes (criteria
deﬁning deliberation) and effects (its beneﬁ-
cial consequences). Second, the tests of delib-
erative theory offered to date typically do not
develop well-speciﬁed explanations for the re-
lationships between deliberation and its many
proposed beneﬁts. Third, deliberative theory
is inconsistent with much of what is already
known about political discourse in group con-
texts. Many, though not all, of the hypotheses
that ﬂow from the deliberative framework are
not well-grounded in either previous theory
or empirical evidence.
Below, I discuss each of these three prob-
lems. I then turn to the more constructive
business of suggesting how empiricists might
more productively approach deliberative the-
ory in the future.
2For further descriptions of these criteria for productive
empirical theory, see Hoyle et al. (2002) or Babbie (2001).
CLEARLY DEFINED CONCEPTS
Deliberative theory includes many concepts
that have generated tremendous research in-
terest; this is precisely why it has become so
popular. Concepts such as reason-giving and
equal participation and so forth have become
valuable constructs in empirical theory and re-
search. But it would be a stretch to claim that
deliberation is itself a well-deﬁned concept.
In fact, it may be fair to say that there are as
many deﬁnitions of deliberation as there are
theorists, although there are certainly com-
monalities among these conceptualizations as
well.
In empirical social science, conceptual def-
initions are often arbitrary. They must ﬁt log-
ically within the broader theoretical frame-
work of relationships proposed, but it is widely
recognized as a senseless and unproductive ex-
ercise to haggle about what qualiﬁes as true
deliberation. However, to the extent that any
given researcher speciﬁes necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions, we at least have a sense of
what qualiﬁed as deliberation for this partic-
ular study, and what its consequences were.
The pattern of ﬁndings over time thus gradu-
ally reveals which elements in the deﬁnitions
best produce which consequences.
As Thompson (2008) points out, theorists
disagree on many elements deﬁning delib-
eration, such as whether deliberation must
culminate in a binding consensus, whether
it must necessarily be public, or whether in-
formal conversations among ordinary people
qualify. Indeed, much of the normative liter-
ature is concerned with reﬁning these deﬁni-
tions and debating what should or should not
be required.
Although it may seem desirable to let a
thousand ﬂowers bloom in this regard, if we
cannot agree on what the independent vari-
able is, we cannot hope to systematically eval-
uate its impact. Interestingly, the number of
conceptions of deliberation is surpassed per-
haps only by the number of versions of so-
cial capital, another concept that has intrigued
both theorists and empiricists. Perhaps a
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certain amount of conceptual ambiguity is in-
herent in extremely rich concepts. Whatever
the cause, the lack of agreement about what
constitutes deliberation makes it extremely
difﬁcult for empirical researchers to address
the claims of normative theory. How can one
safely assert that deliberation has occurred
when there are no necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions routinely applied to this concept?
For those who study political discourse as it
occurs in real-world contexts, how can one
decide if the type of discourse that transpired
qualiﬁes?
For theorists, this lack of agreement and
uneven stipulation of deﬁnitions is less trou-
bling. But for those who want to know
whether deliberation produces its promised
beneﬁts before they sink millions of dollars
of foundation money into encouraging more
of it, the uncertainty is problematic indeed.
Thompson’s (2008) review of what should and
should not qualify according to normative
theory illustrates a desire not to exclude, but in
so doing renders deliberation a far less useful
concept for empirical research than it might
be. For example, Thompson suggests that or-
dinary political discussion should be distin-
guished from the decision-oriented talk that
constitutes deliberation. But this argument
is seemingly contradicted by the subsequent
suggestion that “maintaining this distinction
should not be taken to imply that other forms
of discussion are somehow less worthy of a
place in deliberative democracy, but we can
more clearly retain the connection to the cen-
tral aim of deliberative theory if we treat those
other activities as part of a larger deliberative
process, rather than instances of deliberation
per se.” Likewise, Thompson suggests that al-
though like-minded discussion does not qual-
ify as deliberation, “[T]hat is not to say that
discussion among like-minded people cannot
contribute to deliberative democracy.”
Empirical researchers attempting to test
deliberative theory can be forgiven for want-
ing to bang their collective heads against a wall
in reaction to deﬁnitions of this kind. What
does it mean to say that something is not part
of deliberation but is part of the larger deliber-
ative process? And if one theorist’s version of
normative theory includes the requirement of
consensus decision-making whereas another’s
does not, then how do social scientists design
studies that address the implications of delib-
erative theory?
It is commonly claimed that empirical
studies do not fully embrace deliberative the-
ory, and of course this statement is entirely
correct. No study could include all criteria in-
voked by all theorists collectively, and to do so
would violate even other theorists’ conceptu-
alizations of deliberation. Thus, the conversa-
tion between theorists and empiricists is next
to impossible if one aims to produce research
that can be used to decide whether to pursue
deliberation at all, or whether such practices
need reﬁnement in order to work beneﬁcially.
The common problem faced by empirical re-
searchers is that when beneﬁts are not found
from a given conceptualization of deliberation
in a particular study, the null ﬁndings are as
easily attributed to the operationalization of
deliberation as to the theory itself. Given this
state of affairs, it is difﬁcult to envision dis-
conﬁrming evidence that would be widely ac-
cepted as such.
Theorists are loath to exclude many kinds
of political talk from the deliberative frame-
work; in fact, the trajectory has been toward
progressively greater inclusiveness, incorpo-
rating emotional as well as rational appeals,
informal speech as well as rule-bound dis-
course, and so forth. This very openness de-
lays progress in understanding deliberation’s
consequences. If the deliberative umbrella is
too broad, then it is not clear how delibera-
tive theory can be differentiated from any of
dozens of other theories. Indeed, much of the
literature cited in overviews of evidence on
deliberation does not purport to be about de-
liberation so much as about persuasion, so-
cial interaction, procedural fairness, etc. (see,
e.g., Delli Carpini et al. 2004). Nor is it clear
what a given conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation
says about deliberative theory. A more nar-
rowly speciﬁed independent variable might
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better serve progress toward understanding
how to achieve the ends sought by advocates of
deliberation.
In short, my quarrel is not with how the-
orists have chosen to deﬁne deliberation but
with the fact that the concept itself is a moving
target. If every theorist’s deﬁnition is some-
what different from the next, then it is impos-
sible to study deliberation in a way that the-
orists collectively ﬁnd relevant to their work.
Upon encountering an unsupportive (or sup-
portive) ﬁnding, it is far too easy to dismiss
it as uninformative because the deliberation
that took place in that particular study did not
satisfy all of the prerequisites offered collec-
tively by deliberative theory, even if it did sat-
isfy some theorists’ deﬁnitions.
The solution that theorists have gener-
ally offered is not a clear deﬁnition of this
phenomenon but an evaluative distinction
between “good” deliberation and “bad” delib-
eration. If we grade the many forms of delib-
eration along a continuous scale from good to
bad, then we can predict that more beneﬁcial
consequences will result from good delibera-
tion than from bad. To the extent that good
deliberation actually brings about more of the
beneﬁcial consequences than bad delibera-
tion, we can conclude that deliberation is de-
livering the beneﬁts that the theory promises.
The more that political discourse approaches
the ideal of equal opportunities to speak, for
example, the more it will bring about the pro-
posed beneﬁts. The more reason-giving that
occurs, the more valuable should be the con-
sequences of this activity. Fishkin (1995, p. 41)
calls this continuum “incompleteness”:
When some citizens are unwilling to weigh
some of the arguments in the debate, the
process is less deliberative because it is in-
complete in the manner speciﬁed. In practi-
cal contexts, a great deal of incompleteness
must be tolerated. Hence, when we talk of
improving deliberation, it is a matter of im-
proving the completeness of the debate and
the public’s engagement in it, not a matter
of perfecting it. . .
It is unclear, however, at what point a pro-
cess of this kind is so “incomplete” as to be
irrelevant to the study of deliberation. More-
over, the logic behind the idea of a continuum
of predictions is not as simple as it ﬁrst ap-
pears. For example, should bad deliberation
merely produce fewer beneﬁcial effects than
good deliberation? Or should bad delibera-
tion produce deleterious effects, such that bad
deliberation is worse than no deliberation at
all? Moreover, are some evaluative standards
more important than others, such that no ben-
eﬁcial consequences should be expected un-
less some minimal conditions are ﬁrst met?
Because so many different criteria have
been proposed for the deliberative ideal, using
evaluative standards is unfortunately no easier
than establishing clear conceptual criteria. In
practice, good deliberation is often deﬁned as
deliberation that produces the desired conse-
quences outlined in the theory. This circular-
ity makes it impossible to use this approach to
evaluate the claims of deliberative theory.
A related confounding of cause and effect
manifests itself in two different kinds of claims
involving deliberation and its consequences.
The more obviously difﬁcult situation is when
the independent variable (deliberation) is de-
ﬁned in terms of its hypothesized effects. As
Elster (1998, p. 9) notes, empiricists tend to
be interested in “whether and when the em-
pirically identiﬁable phenomenon of discus-
sion has good results, rather than to deﬁne it
such that it is intrinsically desirable.” Theo-
rists are more likely to treat deliberation as
something to promote rather than evaluate.
As Fearon (1998, p. 63) notes, to facilitate
meaningful empirical claims about delibera-
tion, “we should keep distinct (a) arguments
for why more deliberation would be a good
thing and (b) arguments that in effect de-
ﬁne deliberation or ‘deliberative democracy’
so that these entail good things.”
A second source of confusion in under-
standing the consequences of deliberation is
studies that “test” deliberative theory by fo-
cusing on the extent to which political dis-
course meets some set of qualiﬁcations. Based
www.annualreviews.org • Is Deliberative Democratic Theory Falsifiable? 527
ANRV344-PL11-23 ARI 17 April 2008 13:16
on such assessments, some scholars infer vari-
ous beneﬁts from the quality of the discussion.
Just as an analysis of the content of a polit-
ical advertisement tells us nothing about its
effects on voters, the content of deliberation
tells us nothing about whether it changes its
participants in the directions theorists hope.
More importantly, this confusion means that
those claiming to “test” or “evaluate” delib-
erative theory are often testing completely
different hypotheses. For example, some of
the “tests” of deliberative theory identiﬁed
by Thompson (2008) are examinations of
whether political discussion in a particular
time or place meets the standards to be con-
sidered deliberative. Does the discussion in-
volve reason-giving, equal participation, and
so forth? Other studies also reviewed as em-
pirical tests of deliberative theory evaluate
whether, once discussion does meet one or
more standards for deliberation, it produces
any of its theoretically claimed beneﬁts.
These are two very different research ques-
tions, and their conclusions are logically in-
dependent of one another. A given instance of
political discourse might meet all of a given
set of requirements for deliberation and yet
still not produce the beneﬁts that have been
assumed. Likewise, political discourse might
not meet the criteria for deliberation but still
produce some of the beneﬁcial consequences
claimed by deliberative theory. For exam-
ple, in my social network studies (see Mutz
2002), I ﬁnd that exposure to cross-cutting
political discourse produces greater tolerance
and greater awareness of rationales for op-
positional political views. These effects re-
sult from exposure to oppositional political
views even without all the trappings of de-
liberative interaction. In our study of political
discussions in the American workplace, Jeff
Mondak and I similarly ﬁnd that people are
inﬂuenced in the direction of political toler-
ance and greater awareness of the rationales
for oppositional views simply by listening to
their coworkers talk about their political views
(Mutz & Mondak 2006). No one would call
such experiences deliberation; participation in
the conversation is not even necessary. Yet un-
derstanding the kinds of beneﬁts that derive
from simply listening to others is central to
understanding the beneﬁts of the deliberative
process as a whole (Mutz & Mondak 2006,
Mondak & Mutz 2006).
Most theorists and empiricists agree on the
general point that deliberative encounters are
nearly always “incomplete” to some degree,
if for totally different reasons. No one claims
that the ideal speech situation exists in ﬂesh
and blood. Instead, according to theorists, de-
liberation is “still in large part a critical and
oppositional ideal” (Bohman & Rehg 1998,
p. 422). It is a useful ideal type, even if it is
never realized. But, as empiricists are likely to
question, is it wise to work toward the realiza-
tion of a goal that we are uncertain will prove
beneﬁcial?
In my view, whether an instance of dis-
course meets a set of criteria to qualify as
deliberative is irrelevant for theorists and em-
piricists alike, though for somewhat different
reasons than Thompson (2008) suggests. He
notes: “Although critics repeatedly brandish
the ﬁndings of inequality to declare deliber-
ative democracy fatally ﬂawed, most deliber-
ative theorists are neither surprised nor dis-
couraged. . . . Research that shows speciﬁcally
what conditions and changes might mitigate
inequality can be useful.” Arguably, this ap-
proach puts the cart before the horse. Before
we set a goal of equality within a delibera-
tive context, or attempt to change decision-
making processes to meet any other deliber-
ative standard, we should ﬁrst have evidence
that the theory works as advertised and that
these particular standards are crucial to its
beneﬁcial outcomes. To extend this example,
until we know that moving closer to a goal
of equal participation will ultimately produce
more beneﬁcial goods, setting such a goal
seems premature. At this point in the develop-
ment of this research, evaluations of the qual-
ity of existing instances of deliberation are ir-
relevant to empiricists as well, but not because
they can always be made more ideal. Know-
ing what a given instance of deliberation is
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like simply cannot tell us anything about its
consequences.
The fact that the ideal conditions do not
exist introduces a painful circularity into stud-
ies that attempt to test whether deliberation
produces any of the beneﬁts that are theoret-
ically predicted. If negative evidence is pro-
duced by a study that attempts to look at the
consequences of deliberation, such evidence
is easily dismissed because the discussion in
question did not meet all of the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions to qualify as deliberation.
Once again, deliberative theory is rendered
unfalsiﬁable.
To summarize, studies of the quality of de-
liberation should not be mistaken for evidence
of its beneﬁcial effects. Likewise, deliberation
cannot proﬁtably be deﬁned according to the
effects it is anticipated to produce. Tests of
whether the conditions necessary for delib-
eration are actually occurring must be differ-
entiated from evaluations of whether bene-
ﬁts accrue when the conditions do occur. The
latter is an attempt to test deliberative the-
ory, whereas the former is purely a descriptive
exercise that will not facilitate future predic-
tions about the effectiveness of deliberative
decision-making processes.
As Thompson (2008) summarizes, “The
conditions under which deliberative democ-
racy thrives may be quite rare and difﬁ-
cult to achieve.” But Thompson also suggests
that empirical researchers focus on identify-
ing conditions under which deliberative the-
ory works, for purposes of ﬁguring out how
we can make it work by changing unfavorable
conditions to favorable ones. At this juncture,
the traditions of normative theory begin to
befuddle the empiricist. This is because de-
liberative democratic theory is unabashedly a
social movement as well as a theory. Its ad-
vocates promote it not only as a pet theory
but also as a social cause. Whether and why it
works to bring about the ends that delibera-
tive theorists seek remains to be seen.
Rather than “making it work” or search-
ing long and hard for conditions under which
it might be made to work, I suggest a some-
what different tack for social scientists, one
that slowly but progressively accumulates ev-
idence by testing parts of the theory while
also leaving open the possibility that these
ends might be better achieved another way.
Although deliberative theory is full of inspir-
ing and promising ideas, researchers should be
under no obligation to “make it work” if the
conditions under which it is beneﬁcial turn
out to be rare. If there is an easier, more efﬁ-
cient way to achieve some of these same ends,
scholars should be open to these possibilities.
The important question is not whether delib-
erative processes can be forced into a mold
that will produce positive consequences, but
whether this decision-making process is the
best way to achieve the desired ends relative
to other plausible possibilities.
SPECIFICATION OF LOGICAL
RELATIONSHIPS
In addition to requiring well-deﬁned con-
cepts, empirical theories also require that re-
lationships between concepts be speciﬁed in
a logical manner. Assuming for the moment
that we have a set of necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions that constitute deliberation, and
thus lack of clarity is no longer a problem, two
additional complications come into play. One
problem stems from lack of attention to the
internal logic of these relationships, and the
second involves the nature of the assumed re-
lationships between deliberation and its ben-
eﬁts in this multifaceted theory.
As reﬂected in Thompson’s (2008) article,
theorists are realistic enough to understand
that empirical tests of deliberation cannot be
limited to the infrequent achievement of these
ideals. Partial successes can also produce em-
pirical evidence that speaks to the theory. As
Thompson suggests, “The closer the actual
deliberation comes to meeting the standards,
the better it is in terms of deliberative the-
ory.” This frequently unstated assumption has
allowed at least some research to be charac-
terized as empirically “testing” deliberative
theory. We do not need to wait for status
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Table 1 Example of middle-range approach to deliberative hypotheses
differences among human beings to disappear
in order to test the theory, nor for all partici-
pation to be completely equal.
Unfortunately, to date, the “black box” of
deliberation has been exactly that—a morass
of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions all
thrown together, without speciﬁcation of why
each of these various components is necessary,
nor theory that links each of them to a spec-
iﬁed desirable outcome. As illustrated by the
left-hand column in Table 1, the list of com-
ponents necessary for discourse to be deemed
deliberative is extensive if one simultaneously
considers all that have been suggested.
To begin to understand the impact of such
a long laundry list of factors, scholars should
examine the impact of just one or two of these
factors at a time. One study, for example,
might tell us that moderators, by enhancing
equality of participation, help produce bet-
ter cooperation. Another might demonstrate
that greater reason-giving by participants en-
hances learning of oppositional perspectives.
Discussions that enforce high standards of ci-
vility might also produce higher levels of will-
ingness to compromise. The important part
of this enterprise should be to identify which
characteristics of deliberative practice pro-
duce which kinds of desirable outcomes.
Many of the factors listed in Table 1
already have been studied from this perspec-
tive. For example, experimental research sug-
gests that a face-to-face context increases
people’s likelihood of cooperation (e.g.,
Bornstein 1992, Sally 1995), thus validat-
ing the usefulness of that component of
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deliberation in producing cooperation. But
Barker & Hansen (2005) ﬁnd that inducing
deeper, more systematic processing of infor-
mation produces less consistent attitudes than
a control group, thus suggesting that opinion
consistency is not a probable outcome of in-
creased reﬂection. Yet another study focusing
on consensual decision making showed that
exchanging information about preferences in-
creased consensual decision making, but it did
so even without any discussion (Gaertner et al.
1999). Notably, in each of these examples,
the independent variable is not deliberation
per se; it is some component said to partially
comprise deliberation. In addition, the cho-
sen independent variable cannot logically be
expected to have an impact on all of the de-
pendent variables in the same, beneﬁcial di-
rection. A given component might produce a
positive impact on one outcome and a nega-
tive effect, or none at all, on another (see, e.g.,
Mutz 2006).
In reality, it is highly unlikely that all of
the conditions on the left side of the table
are necessary for each of the outcomes on
the right. Moreover, to rationalize delibera-
tive theory as a middle-range theory, scholars
need to ﬁgure out precisely what elements in
the left-hand column are logically related to
the consequences on the right. For example,
it makes sense that people must be exposed to
disagreement and reason-giving in order to
develop a heightened awareness of rationales
for oppositional views. It does not necessarily
make sense, however, that this exchange must
occur face to face, or in a group rather than a
dyad. Not all of these conditions are necessary
for learning to occur. Likewise, it makes sense
that civility of discourse should be important
if the enterprise is to increase people’s will-
ingness to compromise with one another and
to increase levels of social trust. On the other
hand, if the outcome of interest is greater in-
ternal consistency of opinion, then it makes
little sense that civility should be required.
One can conceivably treat the two columns
in Table 1 as opportunities for lines to be
drawn to indicate when there is a clear theo-
retical reason to expect a relationship between
an element in the left-hand column and an-
other in the right-hand column. But to ar-
gue that everything on the left has a theo-
retical relationship to everything on the right
stretches believability. It is this “grand the-
ory” approach to deliberative democracy that
has undermined progress toward understand-
ing what is important for which purposes. It is
plausible that multiple conditions on the left
are necessary to produce a given outcome on
the right, but it is implausible that each and
every factor in this list must be aligned in or-
der to produce any consequence of value.
For example, the kind of direct, face-to-
face exchange that traditionally characterizes
deliberation need not occur in order for peo-
ple to become better informed. There are un-
doubtedly easier, far less expensive means of
producing that end than hosting a delibera-
tive poll, as successful information campaigns
have demonstrated (see, e.g., Klingemann &
Roemmele 2007). Moreover, enhancing the
depth of understanding of one’s own position
relative to others’ probably does not require a
public forum; it happens commonly in private
settings as well. If one wants to enhance mu-
tual respect among those of opposing views,
then civility is probably a requirement for the
discourse to be effective, but requiring that the
group reach a consensus seems superﬂuous to
this particular goal. If one envisions Table 1
as a matching game, in which everything on
the right must be matched to one or more
factors on the left, then we have a primitive
middle-range theory generator for purposes
of deliberative theory.
By opening the black box of deliberation
and sorting out the importance of its con-
tents in relation to various consequences, em-
pirical research could greatly enhance the ca-
pacity of deliberative theory to contribute to
democratic society. Few contexts demand all
of the outcomes listed on the right side of
Table 1, so advocates of deliberative encoun-
ters would simply need to decide what was
most important to achieve in a given context
and design accordingly. In addition, by paring
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down the list of required conditions for
any given outcome, advocates of deliberative
democracy could more efﬁciently and realis-
tically achieve those goals. But this can only
happen if empirical scholars consider deliber-
ation as one small group of requirements at a
time. Holistic consideration of the concept is
clearly an impediment to advancing this kind
of understanding.
I suspect that, in the long run, delibera-
tive theory may end up with a research history
similar to that of intergroup contact theory.
Initiated by Allport (1954), this inﬂuential
social theory suggested that contact among
members of different racial groups would
lead to greater mutual understanding and re-
duce prejudice. Allport’s version of the the-
ory began with four necessary conditions for
the type of contact that would prove beneﬁ-
cial. Unfortunately, it accumulated so many
additional necessary conditions over the years
that eventually it was deemed a failure be-
cause the laundry list of requirements simply
became too long to be feasible. The theory’s
extensive requirements made it seem imprac-
tical as a means of reducing prejudice and
stereotyping. Even if intergroup contact the-
ory could work under some highly speciﬁc
conditions, those conditions were thought
to be so infrequent and difﬁcult to achieve
that researchers turned elsewhere for ideas on
how to improve intergroup attitudes. As we
now know with the beneﬁt of hindsight, this
abandonment was premature. More recently,
some social scientists have begun to realize
that many of the “necessary” conditions—
including Allport’s original four—were actu-
ally not essential for intergroup contact theory
to work. Although these additional conditions
facilitate more optimal outcomes, they are not
necessary for contact to result in more posi-
tive intergroup attitudes. Thus the theory was
brought back into the realm of practicality and
became a topic of renewed research interest
(see, e.g., Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew & Tropp
2000).
Likewise, some scholars have already
thrown their hands up in the face of the
long list of requirements for effective delib-
eration, arguing that they are impossible to
achieve and/or unlikely to produce beneﬁts
even if achieved (e.g., Sanders 1997). This
reaction is unfortunate because some sub-
set of these necessary conditions (or com-
binations of them) are probably effective in
producing some of these consequences. Em-
pirical researchers simply have not done a
good job of ﬁguring out which are essen-
tial. It would be unfortunate to have the baby
thrown out with the bathwater, but this is pre-
cisely what happened with intergroup contact
theory.
As with the development of most theo-
ries of human behavior, a second step in this
process of building useful empirical knowl-
edge would involve progressively more com-
plicated research designs. Most human behav-
ior is sufﬁciently complex that mere additive
models are unlikely to account for it. Instead,
it is likely that many of the factors in the left
column of Table 1 interact with other factors
in inﬂuencing these outcomes. Thus, it would
not be logical to ask how well a given delibera-
tive encounter stacked up on all of the factors,
create a combined score of deliberative good-
ness, and expect more beneﬁcial outcomes as-
sociated with higher scores. This approach
would be parsimonious, but it is unlikely to
work because (a) not all necessary conditions
are critical for producing each consequence,
and (b) many of the factors are likely to inter-
act with one another.
Imagine, for example, political discourse
that involved extensive reason-giving but also
tremendous incivility. Would it be logical to
anticipate that this combination would pro-
duce beneﬁcial consequences such as greater
willingness to compromise? Wouldn’t one
logically expect the various components to in-
teract with one another such that some com-
ponents (e.g., reason-giving) without another
condition (e.g., civility) could have worse
results than no deliberation at all? Interactive
rather than additive relationships are the
norm when modeling complex human behav-
iors (e.g., Kam & Franzese 2007).
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If the real hypothesis of interest here con-
cerns interaction effects—that is, when po-
litical discourse simultaneously meets some
group of these conditions—then it cannot be
tested without identifying deliberative situ-
ations that include all of these conditions.
As recounted above, theorists may well ar-
gue that a given instance of deliberation pro-
duces legitimacy to the extent that it merely
approaches its ideals, in which case perfection
of this process is beside the point. But surely
there is some minimal level of each of these
criteria that must be met to produce beneﬁcial
consequences of some kind, a “tipping point,”
before which many of these outcomes are un-
likely. If this is not the case—if certain mini-
mal conditions do not need to be met—why
include these criteria as part of deliberation’s
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions to begin
with?
Assuming that researchers are interested in
the question of whether societies are better off
investing lots of time and effort in perfecting
deliberative decision-making processes, and
given the agreed-on impossibility of achiev-
ing all of these necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tions, how can we proceed? If we could safely
assume that the factors identiﬁed as constitut-
ing deliberation contribute via independent,
additive relationships to the desired outcomes
of deliberation, then the potential for this
kind of research would be far more promis-
ing. Unfortunately, this does not seem likely.
Nonetheless, empirical studies of deliberation
would do best by starting small, examining
one or two of the necessary conditions rel-
ative to speciﬁc consequences that follow in
a theoretically logical way. If all variables are
thrown in at once (reason-giving talk among
equals with moderators to ensure equal, rule-
governed participation, and a binding consen-
sus at the end, versus no encounter at all), then
the results will not help us streamline deliber-
ative theory down to its essential elements. If
the theory retains as much baggage as it cur-
rently carries, it risks squandering its ultimate
potential.
CONSISTENCY BETWEEN
HYPOTHESES AND
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE
Textbook descriptions of good empirical the-
ory routinely include the requirement of
consistency with previous evidence. This re-
quirement is intended to help move theory
and research forward more quickly and efﬁ-
ciently. Why waste time proposing a theory
for which there is already a substantial body
of contradictory evidence?
As an empirical theory, deliberative the-
ory has been widely criticized for making as-
sumptions that seem to ﬂy in the face of
what scholars already know about human be-
havior. By this, I do not mean that previ-
ous research suggests that humans cannot ap-
proximate deliberation, but rather that the
implied consequences of such participation
are unlikely based on what we know about
the consequences of human communication.
In other words, even if we achieved the hypo-
thetical ideal speech situation, it would not
lead to the kind of outcomes that the the-
ory envisions. Instead, previous theories tell
us that information processing is inﬂuenced
by characteristics of the listener or message
recipient, the speaker, the message itself, and
the context in which the deliberation occurs.
Notably, only one of these sources of inﬂu-
ence (the message) should matter in a theory
where “the force of the better argument” is
assumed to carry the day. Although a single
article cannot possibly review the large body
of evidence relevant to this particular weak-
ness of deliberative theory (but see Krupnikov
et al. 2007 for an attempt), for purposes of
illustration I provide a few examples of empir-
ically well-supported theories of human be-
havior that appear inconsistent with deliber-
ative theory. In these selected examples, fac-
tors other than argument quality are inﬂuen-
tial in bringing about opinion change, thus
casting doubt on the idea that even well-
reasoned, sincere, persuasive argumentation
can bring about superior decision-making
processes, more consensual decision-making,
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and so forth. To reiterate, the theories and
evidence that I review here do not speak
to whether deliberation itself is feasible, but
rather to whether, even if we do manage to
coax it into existence, its consequences are
likely to be as advertised. If people were all
of equal status, if women spoke out as of-
ten as men, and if people were respected
equally regardless of educational level, rhetor-
ical skills, and so forth, can we be assured
that deliberation would work? Very few so-
cial scientists could offer assurance in this re-
gard. Within the social sciences, large-scale,
federally funded research on persuasion was
instigated around the turn of the century
in response to concerns that America (and
her enemies) could be persuaded by other
than rational means, particularly by means
of war-related propaganda (see, e.g., Sproule
1989). The outgrowth of research on persua-
sion in subsequent decades was not particu-
larly reassuring; people could not always be
counted on to resist irrational arguments or to
ignore superﬂuous cues. What followed was a
cataloging over many years of the sources of
bias in information processing, including con-
ﬁrmatory bias (Lord et al. 1979), perseverance
bias (Ross et al. 1975), and responsiveness to
peripheral cues (Petty & Cacioppo 1981), to
name just a few.
Within political science, the most com-
monly investigated source of bias in process-
ing new information is the person doing the
processing. Deliberative theory typically as-
sumes that people come to the table with opin-
ions and that they are willing to justify those
views publicly in a way that brings people’s
views closer together rather than increases
conﬂict. The problem with this assumption is
that people with different pre-existing opin-
ions and partisan orientations are unlikely to
respond the same way to a given argument, re-
gardless of its inherent rationality and appeal.
In a deliberative encounter, given the re-
quirement of respectful attention, we should
assume that people will not be able to se-
lectively expose themselves to different types
of information. Unfortunately, people may
still selectively interpret the implications and
importance of new information, typically so
that it does not threaten their initial predis-
positions. In the earliest empirical studies of
the impact of information on mass opinion,
Campbell et al. (1960, p. 133) noted, “Identi-
ﬁcation with a party raises a perceptual screen
through which an individual tends to see what
is favorable to his partisan orientation.” Sub-
sequent research has accentuated the impor-
tance of this original observation. The now
extensive literature on selective processing of
information calls into question the idea that
deliberation, through the force of rational ar-
gument, will gradually bring people closer to-
gether and make mutually agreeable compro-
mise possible (see Bartels 2002, cf. Gerber &
Green 1998, 1999). When new information
enters an environment, opinionated citizens
tend to adjust their views in the same general
direction, but they seldom converge—even
when the new information seems to have obvi-
ously unidirectional implications for the issue
at hand. Of course, open-mindedness is also
a prerequisite in some deﬁnitions of deliber-
ation, which might seem to eliminate the po-
tential for this problem. But so long as people
hold initial opinions on an issue, as is true of
most issues worth discussing among the pub-
lic, their information processing is likely to
be inﬂuenced by them. People need not be
closed-minded and dogmatic in order for bi-
ased processing to be problematic.
Whether social scientists like it or not, de-
liberative encounters are inevitably social situ-
ations. Whenever people interact with one an-
other, they will inevitably have many motives
beyond simply the desire to reach the best pol-
icy position. They also want to be perceived
as likable and smart, for example. Models of
political reasoning must consider that politi-
cal reasoning is often motivated by goals other
than accuracy (e.g., Taber et al. 2001).
Most organizers of deliberative events
go to great lengths to assure us that the
information provided is valid and unbiased
toward any particular outcome, but faith in the
deliberative enterprise rests on believing that
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organizers and moderators have somehow
overcome their own biases and also counter-
acted social psychological biases among their
participants. Their efforts to ensure more de-
liberative group dynamics are admirable, yet
many possible dynamics are unlikely to be
recognized based on casual observation. And
even when people are motivated purely by a
desire to reach the best, most accurate con-
clusion with their fellow deliberators, they are
still subject to conscious and unconscious bi-
ases as they process what they hear. These bi-
ases call into question whether the process of
persuasive argumentation will necessarily lead
to a better outcome. For example, if one per-
son claims to have a larger number of argu-
ments than another, he or she will be more
persuasive, even when both people in fact
give the same number of arguments (see Petty
& Cacioppo 1981, Chaiken 1987). In addi-
tion, even if everyone in the deliberative en-
counter views one another as equal in status,
it is likely that some will attribute their views
or arguments to entities of higher status who
are not present (e.g., God), thus making it im-
possible for the argument to stand solely on
the force of its own merit (see, e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo 1981).
Disagreements—a core requirement in de-
liberative settings—appear to trigger greater
stereotyping of out-group members (see
Sinclair & Zunda 2000). This phenomenon
allows the in-group member to dismiss the
out-group member’s views, thus preventing
the kind of mutual understanding that is a
central deliberative beneﬁt. So even if well-
educated, older, white males were not more
likely to participate in political discussion, and
all contributed equally, respectfully, and so
forth, there would still be a tendency for the
in-group arguments to hold sway over those
of out-groups.
In addition, speaking ﬁrst or last in a given
discussion can bias the extent to which one’s
arguments are memorable and inﬂuential in
shaping opinions (see Haugtvedt & Wegener
1994). Those who go ﬁrst are in a better posi-
tion to deﬁne the terms of the debate, framing
how it is discussed substantively in a way that
favors their own perspective.
Entire textbooks are devoted to the enor-
mous list of potential sources of bias in infor-
mation processing and attitude change, thus I
cannot go into all of them here. Today’s mod-
els of biased processing are typical of contem-
porary political psychology in that they share
an underlying skepticism that information is
the cure for all that ails the quality of political
decisions. If people are not passive recipients
of information, but rather active choosers, in-
terpreters, and rationalizers, then the bene-
ﬁts of both information and deliberation—
however closely controlled—are limited. It is
a tall order to expect leaders and modera-
tors to be able to control all of these inter-
actions and potential sources of bias, partic-
ularly when many are not easily observed or
anticipated. Moreover, any system whose use-
fulness depends wholly on locating disinter-
ested, nonpartisan moderators is in trouble to
begin with.
Upon reviewing even this small sample of
evidence, it is clear that there are many es-
tablished theories of group dynamics, com-
munication, and persuasion that are incon-
sistent with deliberative theory. These are
not theories merely suggesting that peo-
ple do not measure up to deliberative stan-
dards when they engage in political discourse;
rather, these theories call into question the
likelihood of beneﬁcial results even when
people do achieve such lofty goals. Clearly,
given its lack of consistency with previous
evidence, deliberative theory does not meet
this particular standard for productive social
theory.
HOW MIGHT WE MOVE
FORWARD?
It is difﬁcult to exaggerate the current enthusi-
asm for deliberation. The amount of time and
money invested in it by governments, foun-
dations, and citizen groups is staggering rel-
ative to virtually any other current social sci-
ence theory. Now that thousands of local and
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national deliberative forums have been held,
one would expect to know far more than we do
about when and why it works well to produce
various outcomes.
As someone who has studied elements of
deliberation in limited ways over the years,
I believe the theory has generated important
empirical scholarship. But I remain uneasy
with the progress that empiricists have made
in understanding what actually transpires in
such complex situations. In many ways, we are
victims of our own desire to live up to the re-
quirements of normative theorists in testing
this theory. Scholars typically try to put all of
a particular list of required conditions into a
single deliberative encounter to study. Doing
so might indeed make deliberative theorists
more likely to take note of the ﬁndings, but
in the end scientiﬁc progress on deliberative
theory will suffer as a result. Thus, ultimately,
I advocate dropping tests of “deliberative the-
ory” per se in favor of testing middle-range
theories. This avenue is likely to be a more
productive means of evaluating the theory,
and one that allows us to remain focused on
essentials.
I am not suggesting that work must con-
form to this approach in order to contribute
signiﬁcantly to academic knowledge. Instead,
I am suggesting that without a systematic
framework along these lines, there is lit-
tle hope that empirical research will usefully
speak to deliberative theory, nor that theory
will speak to practice.
It is informative that in his introductory
section, Thompson (2008) mentions “a pro-
fusion of empirical studies, now more numer-
ous than the normative works that prompted
them,” whereas empirical scholars suggest
that this area of study is in its infancy, and
“not yet very rich or deep” (Ryfe 2005,
p. 64). Likewise, Delli Carpini and colleagues
(2004, p. 316) conclude, “Unfortunately, em-
pirical research on deliberative democracy
has lagged signiﬁcantly behind theory.” De-
spite the seeming contradiction, both of these
claims have the ring of truth. Although empir-
ical work has indeed proliferated, it is not clear
what we have learned as a result. Research
on deliberation suffers from (a) too many
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, which
are each insufﬁciently well-speciﬁed concepts;
(b) a lack of speciﬁcation of the relationships
among the parts comprising the deliberative
whole, and their theoretical linkage to the
desired outcomes; and (c) a lack of a “con-
trol group,” that is, a baseline for compari-
son with other modes of decision making, or
of achieving better-informed, more enlight-
ened opinions, or of increasing willingness to
compromise, or of attaining any other beneﬁt
attributed to deliberation (see Johnson 1998
and Schauer 1999 for a discussion of delib-
eration relative to alternatives). Deliberation
is not the only means of pursuing these var-
ious ends, and advocates and detractors alike
should ﬁnd it useful to know how effective it
is relative to other means.
It is in some ways unfortunate that delib-
erative theory is a cause ce´le`bre for its advo-
cates, as well as an important social theory. I
say this not because I anticipate that it will nec-
essarily have negative effects on democracy
when implemented, but rather because once
a phenomenon acquires such a head of steam
as the deliberative democracy movement has,
it seldom slows down for purposes of advanc-
ing scientiﬁc understanding. Instead, there is
a rush to implement deliberative encounters
willy-nilly, because advocates genuinely be-
lieve that its consequences must, of necessity,
be beneﬁcial. Just as drug companies cannot
be counted on to publicize the negative side
effects of their drugs, advocates—whether in-
dividuals or large organizations—who have
invested huge amounts of time, energy, and
money into organizing and promoting delib-
eration are not likely to be the ﬁrst to perceive,
let alone publicize, any shortcomings. Thus,
whether the consequences of deliberation are,
in fact, consistently beneﬁcial or not, without
careful, methodical study, we will not know
why in either case.
Attention has now turned to large-scale,
institutional implementation of deliberative
practices. These projects are not oriented
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around the best possible research designs for
purposes of understanding what deliberation
can and cannot deliver so much as they are
designed to spread an already accepted prac-
tice as widely as possible. I think this kind of
action is premature.
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